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ABSTRACT
In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict via the 
manufacturing sector, which is the source of wealth for an emerging new elite interested in obtaining 
political representation, and is the outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital 
accumulation. This raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We find 
evidence in favor of our hypothesis in a panel of African countries. 
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In this note we empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict. 
The channel between the two is operationalized by the manufacturing sector, which is the 
source of wealth for an emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and 
is the outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This 
raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We apply this reasoning 
to a panel of African countries over the period 1970-2007. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review the relevant literature and 
exploit this link, and in Section 3 the empirical model, the data and the results are presented. 
Section 4 concludes.  
2. Literature review
The literature on civil conflict stresses the role of three issues: income per-capita, 
institutional quality and state capacity. We link these three issues with manufacturing.
Poorer countries tend to experience more civil conflict. According to Fearon (2007) 
and Besley and Persson (2010), young and poor individuals are more likely to pursue violence 
if the opportunity-cost of conflict would be lower than the benefits of the  status quo. 
Therefore, higher income per-capita increases risk-aversion, reducing the probability of 
violence. Two factors affect individual behavior: on the one hand the ability of the state to 
counteract the insurgence, on the other hand the amount of wealth to get. In particular, natural 
resources, linked with lower institutional quality, cause bad governance, inequality of wealth 
distribution, and elite insulation, which favor fragility, conflict and appropriation (Collier and 
Venables, 2009). Aghion  et al. (2004) pointed out that an insulated political elite can 
redistribute wealth to his own benefit. In fragile states a small number of groups win and the 
others loose. Group differences are linked with several fractures: ethnical origins, socio-
economic status, and history, for example between colonizers and colonized. These cleavages, 
in absence of a political system able to absorb them, can contribute to the emergence of civil 
conflicts.  
From a different point of view, insulated elites emerging from the colonial juncture 
can negatively affect growth. As shown by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008), powerful 
groups have no incentives in promoting economic growth because it could lead to the 
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leading group. Such effect has historical evidence in the cities of Medieval Italy, and in the 
agricultural, proto-industrial and industrial growth of England from the 16
th to the 18
th century 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008) where emerging groups were able to reduce the insulation of 
the most powerful groups and to reform the institutions in a more inclusive way. In this 
perspective we can have a better understanding of the poor performance in protecting property 
rights and enforcing contracts in fragile countries.   
Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) define ‘state capacity’ as the institutions devoted to 
enforce property rights and contracts and to raise taxes, and consider ‘legal’ and ‘fiscal’ state 
capacity. Both are inherited from the investments made in the past in order to increase their 
value. They affect the capacity of the state to design markets and efficient taxation with 
positive effects on the production and distribution of public goods and on income levels. In a 
situation of both political insulation and low investments in fiscal and legal capacities, elites 
can increase their own insulation getting rid of the right to use public goods and redistribution 
for loosing groups. In this way income inequality is related with the origin of the groups. At 
the same time, if natural resources take a large share of production, the fiscal insulation of the 
elite is higher because their revenues are directly managed by the groups in charge of the state 
and not directed towards the population, further reducing accountability as shown by 
Bornhorst et al. (2008).
In Besley and Persson (2010) this model is related with the incidence of civil conflicts. 
The basic idea is that under low insulation, a democratic political system, a good level of 
minorities’ protection, high income and a good system of taxes and transfers and allocation of 
public goods there is a lower probability of experiencing civil conflicts. In contrast, an 
unequal system can end up in two possible situations: repression or civil war. The latter arises 
when the leading group feels itself under threat because another one in increasing his 
productivity and wealth, and therefore reacts through repression. The former takes place when 
the disadvantaged group uses violence that, together with the willingness of the incumbent to 
keep the power, leads to civil conflict. The authors identify a relationship between the quality 
of legal and fiscal institutions and the income level, showing that the joint effects of these 
three dimensions contribute to the emergence of civil conflict.    
Consider, now, a situation in which groups excluded from power in fact control over 
an expanding manufacturing sector. Firstly, capital accumulation will benefit both the 
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primary sector because of higher productivity. The growth of income per-capita will increase 
the opportunity-cost of civil conflict, reducing the probability of its outbreak. Higher income 
and wealth will also make this novel group of manufacturers a new power that will try to 
achieve political representation. The elite can: 1) contrast this quest through repression, 
ending up in a civil conflict that will destroy capital and production; 2) accept the power of 
the new group including it in the political system.
1 This is viable if the benefit from sharing 
power is higher than the expected value of a fight, which includes the possibility of a 
complete loss of power. 
Increased political participation will also affect state capacity. On the one hand, there 
will be better protection of property rights, contracts and a more egalitarian distribution of 
public goods, improving the economic activity. On the other hand, a stronger secondary sector 
will make the government budget less dependent on agricultural products, which are typically 
poorly taxed and have a strong volatility of their prices, affecting revenues from export. This 
is even truer for natural resources. The new industrial elite will be more interested in the 
taxation/public goods package, pushing towards a system more favorable to accumulation. 
We, therefore, highlight a three-way mechanism affecting civil conflict. A stronger 
manufacturing sector will have a direct effect by increasing income and making conflict less 
likely; indirectly, it will reduce the political, legal and fiscal insulation of the system. In turn, 
higher political competition can improve the fiscal and legal effectiveness of the state, making 
it more able to increase production and income. The final outcome is a reduction of civil 
conflicts.
2 
3. Model, data and results
We estimated the following panel data logit model:
Civilwarit = α1 + α2 Xit + α3 Zit + α4 Wit + εit
1 This typically leads to the extension of the franchise.
2 Caruso (2010) follows a reasoning similar to ours within the traditional theory of conflict (guns and butter, to 
which he adds ice-creams). 
4The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one in case of civil conflict and zero otherwise. 
Data are derived from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).
3 The vector Xit includes the added value 
of the agricultural, manufacturing and mining sectors as a percentage of GDP (taken from 
UNCTAD), the vector Zit includes economic variables such as openness over GDP and GDP 
per  capita   (taken  from  Heston  et  al.,  2009), and  Wit  includes   a measure   of ethnic 
fragmentation   (Alesina   et   al.,   2003),   democracy   (Polity   IV   project,   Political   Regime 
Characteristics   and   Transitions,   1800–2009)
4  and   a   dummy   variable   for   sub-Saharan 
countries. Finally, εit is a random error. All estimates are obtained by using random-effect 
probit panel data.
Results show that manufacturing is negative and significant, as predicted by our 
argument. The behavior of the other variables is consistent across estimates, and in general 
quite similar to the one found in the literature. A higher share of GDP coming from natural 
resources increases the probability of conflict, as it is well known in the “resource curse” 
literature; the same holds for per capita GDP, since higher income increases the cost of 
conflict. Higher openness also decreases the probability of conflict, possibly because of 
higher competition  that increases  the cost of conflict.  An interesting  result concerns 
government spending, which positively affects conflict. The level of democracy also reduces 
the possibility of civil conflict. 
Sub-Saharan countries do not behave differently from North African countries, and 
also ethnic fragmentation is not significant. The share of GDP devoted to agriculture is also 
insignificant.
4. Conclusions
In this note we argued that manufacturing is a key element in determining state 
capacity by providing both financial resources through taxation for investments and public 
goods, and by creating a new class of entrepreneurs that are interested in better governance 
and a more competitive political market. We have tested our prediction on a panel of 53 
African   countries   over   the   period   1970-2007,   and   we   found   that   the   share   of   the 
manufacturing over GDP is negatively related with the occurrence of conflict.
3 The dataset is available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets (accessed on July 2010).
4 This index is bounded between –10 and 10, where 10 means perfect democracy.
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6Table 1 – Civil war
(1) (2) (3)
Agriculture 0.011 0.011 0.011
(1.80) (1.76) (1.84)
Manufacturing -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
(2.00)* (1.99)* (2.01)*
Mining 0.036 0.036 0.036
(4.49)** (4.58)** (4.65)**
Democracy -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(5.52)** (5.53)** (5.49)**
Openness -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(4.21)** (4.34)** (4.41)**




GDP per capita -0.019 -0.019 -0.019
(3.33)** (3.33)** (3.36)**
Constant -2.544 -2.645 -2.364
(3.41)** (3.70)** (4.92)**
Observations 1793 1793 1826
Loglikelihood -605.905 -606.000 -615.734
Wald χ
2 100.33** 100.30** 99.56**
Likelihood-ratio test for ρ = 0 314.14** 316.18** 323.31**
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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